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Presentations included in these proceedings represent most of the 
formal part of the program of the seventh Ohio Dairy Seminar, held October 
5-6, 1972. This seminar has been sponsored jointly by the Ohio Milk 
Producers Federation and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, in cooperation 
with the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, the 
Ohio State University. 
The seminar has two basic objectives: 
1. To develop fuller communications between the Ohio Milk 
Producers Federation and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation 
on the marketing-policy issues confronting the dairy 
industry. 
2. To discuss and analyze the major priority problem areas 
in the dairy industry that producer organizations must 
contend with. 
Current problems in the milk industry were emphasized in this seminar, 
including bargaining problems in the industry, status of advertising-promotion 
programs, milk pricing policy, and supply management issues. Various 
viewpoints were presented at the seminar and are included in the proceed-
ings. Opinions are those of the participants and are not necessarily 
endorsed by the Ohio State University. 
The Planning Committee for this seventh seminar in the series included 
Sam Cashman and William McNutt, Ohio Farm Bureau Federation; Glen Wagner, 
Donald Zehr, Robert Hester, and Norm Alger, Ohio Milk Producers Federation; 
and David Hahn and Robert Jacobson, The Ohio State University. 
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IS U.D.I.A. AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE OLD WAY? 
Earl Poling 
General Manager 
American Dairy Association of Ohio 
In looking at the topic assigned to me, it will seem most simple to 
say yes or no, or I don't know. However, it seems that the subject 
needs a little more consideration. Perhaps at this stage of the game it 
is impossible to give a definite answer, and each person or group of per-
sons may arrive at various answers, depending on their particular interest. 
However, in attempting to arrive at some sort of a logical conclusion, 
it seems that in a brief fashion we should consider: 
1. What is the old way -- what do we mean? 
2. What do we mean by improvement -- improvement in: 
a. more funds 
b. more coordination of programs 
c. better accountability 
d. more centralized authority in making decisions --
if so, at what level -- national, state, or other? 
3. Why was U.D.I.A. formed? 
In reviewing the "old way" it seems most logical to relate procedures 
used in the A.D.A. and N.D.C. program. 
From approximately 1940 to July 1, 1971, funds invested by producers 
for these two programs were invested in and accounted for through the 
American Dairy Association of a particular state or region, such as Ohio, 
Michigan, or the Atlantic area, which comprised several states. The 
state had a membership agreement with American Dairy Association,and A.D.A. 
had the responsibility of developing a program. 
As you know, the funds were used to develop certain advertising and 
sales programs. In addition, certain funds were allocated for research 
and to the National Dairy Council. 
During this period, N.D.C. was not to contact producers for funds. 
Local Dairy Council units still had to solicit funds from producers. In 
general, the amount allocated to N.D.C. was an amount equal to that 
invested by handlers and equipment manufacturers. 
As you can see, American Dairy Association and the state organiza-
tions were performing, to a certain degree, the function of a U.D.I.A. 
I am sure most producers did not quite understand this arrangement. 
This arrangement seemed to work with a fair degree of success. How-
ever, it didn't achieve some things: 
1. lt didn't get programs coordinated. 
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2. It didn't bring the local dairy council units into the 
picture, either as to program coordination, or for financing. 
And, in some areas of the country, this apparently was a 
problem. 
Point No. 2. What are we talking about in referring to U.D.I.A.? 
Briefly, are we talking about a national program, or are we talking about 
a U.D.I.A. that includes all levels, or all levels at some degree? In 
view of trends of organizational structure in some areas, the question 
seems appropriate. Also, the trends in marketing and market areas make 
the consideration all the more important. 
Point No. 3. Why was U.D.I.A. formed? As is often the case, it is 
impossible to state the exact time and place, or the individuals who formed 
the U.D.I.A. It is fair to say that for many years certain people had the 
idea of some sort of organization that would bring N.D.C. and A.D.A. 
closer together, and with the formation of DRINC, these same people would 
no doubt include the research efforts. 
In addition to the long-time efforts to better coordinate the pro-
grams of A.D.A. and N.D.C., another set of factors were introduced with 
the formation of larger cooperatives. These organizations were then 
operating over a much larger geographical area and more important, are 
investing more money, both per hundredweight and total dollars. Conse-
quently, they demanded: 
1. more accountability, 
2. more coordinated programs, and 
3. better programs. 
Time does not permit the relating of all the steps that lead up to 
the formation of U.D.I.A. It does seem fair to say that U.D.I.A. grew 
out of an attempt to merge N.D.C. and A.D.A. As a result of this attempt, 
a study was made which said that an organization should be formed to pro-
vide financing of the two efforts, keeping the two programs separate. 
Thus, U.D.I.A. was formed on June 9, 1970, with bylaw changes made 
on September 29 and November 19, 1970. Glen Lake was named president. 
This organization provided that A.D.A. and N.D.C. would each have 
nine members on the Board of Directors, and DRINC, five. 
With the exception of Michigan Milk, the organization had few, if 
any, takers. The principle reason offered was the structure of the orga-
nization. 
Consequently, the efforts of those who had felt strongly about some 
of these things seemed to be doomed for failure. 
However, in April, 1971, certain people came forth with a revised 
version of U.D.I.A. This plan, briefly--
1. Placed U.D.I.A. under a producer Board and Executive 
Committee with rather broad powers, 
2. Representation according to total dollars invested in 
promotion work. 
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3. Boards of N.D.C. - A.D.A. to come from the U.D.I.A. Board. 
It is significant that the chief officers in the major cooperatives 
endorsed this revision. They said, in effect, "This type of organization 
best fits the present situation, and we will raise the money to do the 
job." Consequently, on July 15, 1971, the present organization was 
adopted. 
This is the history, briefly, and where we are today. 
Also, it should be noted that many areas of the country are stream-
lining or revising their state or regional organization in regard to the 
fund raising, producer accountability, and probably most important, pro-
gram execution and coordination. 
Without taking any time to explain, I refer to: 
1. A.D.A. - N.D.C. of New York, 
2. Milk promotional services in the Northeast, 
3. s.u.n.r.A. 
4. Midland U.D.I.A. - Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri 
5. South Dakota and Arizona 
Ohio, or Ohio and some surrounding territory, seems to be a fairly 
well contained unit, both in production and markets. I would suggest 
that we take a look at these areas just mentioned. No doubt we may need 
some changes and these areas may provide some valuable points. 
Where are we nationally? No doubt some things have been accomplished. 
Example: 
1. Meeting together, 
2. Same advertising agency 
However, the changes and adjustments to be made for U.D.I.A. to work 
seem to be coming along slow. Some organizations and people seem to have 
difficulty adjusting to such a setup. 
The U.D.I.A. concept calls for: 
1. More funds and a total program for all dairy products, 
2. More program coordination, 
3. Probably more centralization of program planning, 
4. Programs to reduce administrative costs. 
The use of Federal Orders and the producer agencies to handle the funds 
create another dimension. The Boards of the cooperatives in most cases have 
had first supervision of the funds raised from producers for promotional 
work. It seems that this function has or is being transferred to the so-
called agencies. 
It appears that the trend has been for agencies to follow the U.D.I.A. 
concept and allocate funds for existing p~ograms, rather than create new 
ones. If this concept is followed in the future by present and new agencies, 
then the use of Federal O~ders to create funds can be a useful tool. 
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However, if each agency wants to become a promotional expert, with an 
advertising agency, staff of people, etc., then more may be lost than 
gained for a united program. 
To develop some guidelines for program allocations for 1973, a study 
was authorized and made by a management firm, Booz, Allen, Hamilton & Co. 
The study is long and detailed, but in principle contains a great deal of 
valuable information and guidelines. Some specific items may need more 
study. 
One area that is stressed is the organizational structure of U.D.I.A. 
The authority to bring about some of the changes needed seems to be lack-
ing, according to Booz, Allen, Hamilton. In addition, it seems that other 
problems facing U.D.I.A. are: 
The BAH study did offer suggestions for improvement in current pro-
grams. Also, criticisms were directed at certain programs. 
Is U.D.I.A. an improvement? In the short run, improvements may be 
hard to find. Ohio dollars are going to U.D.I.A. to support A.D.A., N.D.C., 
and DRINC. With more dollars going to N.D.C., naturally less is available 
for other programs. 
In the long run, it does seem that U.D.I.A. can be an improvement. 
It can be the vehicle to bring changes -- bring in more funds, more coordi-
nation of programs, and better execution of these programs. 
In summary, perhaps U.D.I.A. hasn't quite achieved to date all that 
was hoped for. But progress is on the way. Changes have to be made and 
will be made. 
Some years ago I heard a highly successful football coach say that 
it didn't matter to him whether a boy was big or little. It wasn't his 
size that made him good or poor, but what was in his heart that counted. 
That may be the key to making U.D.I.A. what it is meant to be. 
Yes, dairy promotion can be better with U.D.I.A., and all this 
implies at any level. The technical aspects and programs will be worked 
out if those in command have their hearts and attitudes in the right 
place, and want to build a united sales program for the dairy industry. 
In conclusion, the following quotation from Glenn Lake seems appropri-
ate. In a booklet issued in December, 1970, on "Why U.D.I.A.?", Mr. Lake 
stated as follows: 
"The dairy industry has been out-done, out-manenvered, and out-
distanced by other food competitors. Coca-Cola alone puts more money 
in promotion each year than the entire dairy industry. As we look to 
the future, population experts say we should gain about 30 million poten-
tial customers in the next ten years. Our job is to get these new cus-
tomers to use dairy products. 
"There is a very real opportunity to increase our selling efforts 
through expanded and coordinated programs of A.D.A, N.D.C., and DRINC 
and their affiliates. For the first time in history we have a chance to 
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build an industry-wide effort through the United Dairy Industry Associa-
tion. Those of us who are working with it are dedicated to its success. 
The impossible has been achieved. Now it must succeed. 11 
The preceding observations indicate that some adjustments in the 
structure and staffing of U.D,I.A. are needed if the organization is to 
effectively fulfill its mission of building the market for dairy products. 
The principal requirements which should be met in adjusting the organiza-
tion include the following: 
- Bring the four organizations closer together physically and 
from a management standpoint. 
- Eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort and cost. 
- Clarify the role of the chief executive of U.D.I.A. 
- Provide clear management responsibility and authority to 
achieve coordination in program planning and execution at 
all levels of the organization. 
- Provide appropriate staff resources, particularly in the 
marketing area. 
- Clarify the responsibilities of and relations between the 
national and local units. 
Because of the importance of organization structure and staffing to the 
programming efforts, it is recommended that U.D.I.A. give highest priority 
to the issues discussed in this chapter. If the organization is solid, the 
programs will follow. If the organization is weak, the likelihood of 
program success is minimal. 
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THE COURT SCENE IN FARM BARGAINING AND FARMER COOPERATIVES 
Glen Wagner 
Legal Counsel 
Ohio Milk Producers Federation 
I want to review the development in certain court cases over the last 
year. First, those dealing with the anti-trust law which I consider the 
most important aspect as far as legal problems with cooperatives are con-
cerned; second, the Federal order cases; and finally, a reference to the 
Agricultural Fair Practices Act. 
I think by all odds the most important development of the last year 
has been the indictment by the Justice Department against Associated Milk 
Producers, Inc., filed in the District Court in San Antonio, Texas. The 
indictment in this instance charged AMPI with certain predatory practices 
that certainly, if true as alleged, would raise questions as to their 
legality. Included, however, in some of the charges and explanation in 
the indictment are other phases of marketing milk that raise serious ques-
tions as to whether normal practices carried on by an association and acting 
on behalf of its members may not be chilled or banned, if final settlement 
in this case goes as far as apparently is sought by Justice. 
In the case of this particular association, the largest dairy coopera-
tive in the U. S., there are many private treble damage suits that are 
pending and more are being filed. 
The reference to this indictment, which will be expanded later in 
these proceedings, involved practices such as loading the pool, buying 
routes that are serving non-members, and then discountinuing these routes, 
and certain practices dealing with processors and their re-sale of pro-
ducts. I would hope that whatever consent degree is arrived will be con-
fined to what we all generally agree are predatory practices, things that 
we know have been illegal and should be banned; practices, for instance, 
that were proven to be illegal in the old cranberry cases; principles 
established, for instance, in the Maryland and Virginia case; things that 
don't inhibit or prevent a cooperative from properly serving its members. 
I think if Justice isn't sophisticated enough to know, at least parties in 
the field know there is a lot of activity in the market place that can be 
misconstrued if it isn't examined in the light of its bearing on the various 
parties. 
Another case I refer to in the anti-trust field is the litigation going 
on in Kansas City, initially between Mid-America and the NFO, later expanded 
to include the Associated Reserve Standby Pool Cooperative and AMPI and other 
private groups related to them. Some months ago, Mid-America filed its 
fifth amended complaint and expanded the litigation well beyond the scope 
it had before. In that complaint they raised questions about governmental 
decisions on NFO made by the Department of Agriculture and the Internal 
Revenue Service. These are somewhat complex, but they involve, among other 
things, the issue as to whether a non-profit organization maintaining that 
it is not marketing and is therefore entitled to a certain exemption under 
a certain portion of the IRS code, can then be qualified by the Department 
of Agriculture as a 'qualified' association under the Federal Milk Order 
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system, and therein maintain that it is marketing milk on behalf of its 
members. Both apparently contradictory positions require a decision and 
a finding by the governmental agency. I would suspect that the agency 
that is more likely to review its findings and do some revising will be 
the Internal Revenue Service. If anyone is interested in discussing that 
we can get into it, since it does raise some questions about activities of 
organizations and how they are organized. It might also have some relation 
to bargaining, as was mentioned by previous speakers, where you would still 
be accorded the status of a bargaining cooperative, even though engaged in 
processing. 
Finally, a short comment on the cases that caused a good deal of con-
cern or attention some years ago and are now pretty well down the road. 
These cases were in Western Pennsylvania. One case, known as Hayes vs. 
DCSA, was a case where a so-called rump group brought a suit against one 
of the main cooperatives in the market in Western Pennsylvania. They 
brought a class action claiming the marketing system and arrangements 
were in violation of the state law, with interstate shipment constituting 
some kind of conspiracy. This case was settled quite a while ago and the 
defendant cooperative made no settlement and paid no money, but under the 
guidance of the court some of the dealers had to come up with a small amount 
of money to pay plaintiff costs and get rid of the case. The court, I 
believe, had indicated that they didn't think that there was any anti-
trust law violation involved here. 
The most interesting case, however, was the Erie-Crawford Case, known 
as the Knuth Case. Again, in this case, the rump group brought suit trying 
to establish a class action against the cooperative. In this case, there 
were actual rebates or paybacks, or whatever you call them, made by the 
cooperative in order to meet competition from out-of-state sellers who 
were apparently free to sell at a lower price. The District Court first 
dismissed this case. It was reinstated by the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Philadelphia and went back for trial in the District Court. The 
jury decided against the defendant cooperative, on the conversion of money 
theory, as far as the rebates were concerned, and the Court held that there 
was no anti-trust violation and no inhibition of competition and, in fact, 
held to the contrary. Then the case was again appealed to the Circuit 
Court in Philadelphia and we had a very interesting reversal. The reversal 
was unanimous and held that the Court erred in several ways in allowing the 
action; and that they could not prevail on the theory that there being, 
on the one hand, no anti-trust violation when the conversion of money did 
occur. The cooperative was converting money that came into its hands in 
terms of giving certain rebates. The Court of Appeals held that the evi-
dence had to show that the cooperative could have sold the milk for more 
money than it actually did. Of course, the evidence in the case was that 
the cooperative could not have sold for more money and that in some cases 
they paid as much or more than the competitive price in the area even though 
they gave a rebate. Evidence established that, for instance, New York 
cooperatives sold milk as cheap or cheaper than Erie cooperatives. But I 
think the most interesting aspect of that case and the one we will remember 
after we have forgotten everything else is the dissent or what I call the 
concurring dissent by one of the three judges that went along with every-
thing that was said and then added another comment. He sai~, nThis is a 
misconceived class acti.Qn and I cannoct understand how the court ever 
granted a clas!il ~t:f.on statt1B to the plaintiff farltlers who were member.s of 
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the cooperative." He said, "A class action has to be brought on behalf of 
everyone in the class against some defendant, but not against members of 
the same class." In this case, of course, if they ever recover any money, 
the plaintiff class would recover against the same class, in this case 
against their own cooperative. I think this was something the lawyers 
tried to get into the case in the beginning but failed. I think that 
principle is something that might point the way ip the future. That as 
far as members of cooperatives bringing a class action, they will have to 
bring it on behalf of the entire class. This case really ended up not 
being a class action in that something less than 10 percent of those who 
were contacted ended up wanting to remain in the case. 
So, the anti-trust cases that are now in court in Kansas City, San 
Antonio, and the private treble damage actions that we have are going to 
set the tone and be very important in terms of the operation of coopera-
tives, especially milk cooperatives in the future. I suspect that in 1973 
we will have some developments. 
Next, a comment on Federal order cases. You understand, of course, 
that a Federal milk order has certain minimum compulsory aspects about it. 
I was listening to the discussion today regarding various criticisms and 
comments as to what the government and their bureaucracy accomplishes. 
I think we should remind ourselves every now and then that the producers 
and producer cooperatives have requested and obtained these Federal orders. 
They seem to be almost universally popular. We may see them some day even 
in California where I believe their milk marketing system has much to be 
desired, and I think that system could stand a searching analysis in rela-
tion to some of the comments made here today. 
But, when we assess what we want in terms of compulsion, we should 
remember that the big thing that the Federal order did and the shocker that 
it was to the milk dealers back in the 30's was the simple fact that at 
its level, the minimum price level, and at its terms, it was compulsory 
on the non-cooperator. No farmer can sell milk below the price fixed in 
the Federal order, and if you say that no farmer ever did, I hasten to 
correct you. There were times when farmers have tried to sell at less 
than the Federal order price in order to have a market, whereupon the 
Federal order required that the dealer pay that farmer the minimum Federal 
order price. Various types of evasion have occurred. Therefore, when we 
talk about extending compulsory aspects such as this to other legislation, 
we should keep in mind what certain elements in the market might try. 
There was one important case last year that I think was helpful and 
set to rest some of the issues revolving around location differentials. 
This was the Sunnyhill Case in Missouri, and again the Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision upheld the statutory authority for location differentials 
and pretty well restored things to where we thought they were before, In 
effect, the Secretary of Agriculture, after a hearing, can set different 
prices under the same Federal milk order, such as in the Ohio valley order 
where a producer serving Dayton, Cincinnati, or Columbus is serving the 
zero zone; if he sends his milk to Northwest Ohio he gets a nickel less; 
if he sends it to Southeast Ohio and West Virginia, he gets a nickel more. 
A decision in the Fairmont Case raised questions about it and the District 
Court in Missouri had held that the Secretary had to fix the same price in 
one order. The Circuit Court, after looking it over, decided that the 
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statute and the Harketing Agreement Act was very clear. You can have dif-
ferent prices in the same order, and I think it pretty well set to rest 
that issue for some time. That does not mean, however, that the nearby 
differential which some of you have heard about was revived. The idea that 
the Secretary of Agriculture could prescribe for those farmers outside a 
metropolitan area very close to town, a Class I price or any price because 
of their farm location, without regard to where the milk was delivered --
that concept is still dead and has been declared illegal and the Department 
to this day maintains the nearby differentials are out of the picture. 
This means that if you are in Franklin County and costs get high and taxes 
get higher and even though your milk buyer is right next door, the Secretary 
cannot fix a higher price there regardless of where your milk goes. He 
can fix a higher price for all milk going into Franklin County to a milk 
dealer who is located there, but just because your farm is there, you can't 
get it. The question of farm-point pricing is another matter altogether. 
That is created in relation to the cost of hauling to the market, and I 
think there are some questions on the legality of that,that are evidently 
not being litigated. 
And finally, a comment about the Agricultural Fair Practices Act. 
Two cases are still pending, one the so-called Lawson case or Weir case in 
Federal District Court. In Cleveland there is a motion pending for a 
summary judgment agreed on by parties. In other words, the judge has the 
case and the briefs have been filed. Evidently the Lawson Hilk Co. takes 
the position that they do not have to buy any milk from a farmer who joins 
a cooperative. On the other hand, the governm~nt agency that brought the 
action insists that simply because a man joins a cooperative is no reason 
to reject him, and it doesn't give the buyer the right to discontinue pur~ 
chasing that producer's milk. I understand that some of the government 
people have serious qualms about whether or not they should seek an order 
requiring the handler to purchase milk from the farmer who joined the coop-
erative. Part of that, I'm sure, is occasioned by the language of the Act 
itself, which does talk about the producer and the handler still being 
able to contract in spite of what the statute says. ' 
I think a more happy result was reached in the second case which, I 
think, is Liechty vs. Bunt..;Wesson, a case already referred to by previous 
speakers, in the Western District Court of Ohio in Toledo. Judge Young 
had no problem with that particular Act. In fact, he felt the Act went 
so far as to bring to an end a period in which a buyer can threaten farmers 
or paint pictures for them to show that if they join the coop, they are 
going to be out of a market. However, the Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Cincinnati reversed the District Court to the extent that the injunction requir-
ing Hunt-Wesson to offer a contract and thereby really make mandatory a 
contract for the purchase of tomatoes was reversed. 'Instead, the judg-
ment allowed the canners to put up a very substantial bond prior to a 
retrial,. whereupon· the parties negotiated a settlement and gave these 
particular growers a contract that certainlyaccomplished what was sought 
in the f · · · · '·t:hel:s~ttlement e.,tclently indicated that the 
. . ' ·. . . :for a pexiod . of time 
us·''.~lei11m ot~l:'. ~ri.en~f:· iJ:1.• • court ~ases ff:~M~f~- · ~,t;~ :.l~~·e' the,il:c ma;t>les 




a significant problem to anyone operating properties and for individual 
farmers with large operations. Therefore, I would say, as of this time, 
we are looking forward to some cases and pronouncements on the anti-trust 
front. I think the results will affect both the operations as we now know 
them, the announcement of premiums, and maybe more importantly, the future 
of bargaining legislation. This is so because the thrust of potential 
bargaining legislation is in part the anti-trust exemption into certain 
activities of bargaining. 
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COPING WITH RUMP GROUPS AND NON-MEMBERS 
W. T. Osborne 
Secretary-Treasurer 
Cincinnati Cooperative Milk Sales Association 
If there were any real answers to this problem, it wouldn't be on the 
program and I wouldn't be here. 
Rump groups, as we are acquainted with the term and the groups today, 
are more vexing than non-members. Not inherently, but because the USDA 
is allowing or enforcing different measures of enforcement for different 
groups -- or so it seems to me. 
The USDA causes all cooperatives to file an "Annual Report of Coopera-
tive Milk Marketing Association" and "qualification" is at issue. If 
qualification is not predicated, in part, at least, on this filing, then 
we should find out why we file. 
Certainly it would appear that the NFO could not acceptably prepare 
this form if for no other reason than that it is not a cooperative; _but, 
by some alchemy they have filed and have been "qualified." Other rump 
groups over the years have sprung up and died. Prior to the NFO, these 
rump groups never were qualified to receive payment on behalf of those 
alleged to be members. If rump groups cannot get control of some member 
money, they will die. If they gain some control, they have a lifeline. 
Their members can apparently bleed a long time. 
Perhaps the NFO can no longer be called a "rump group." It may be 
that any group who pays attorneys fees of the size that it must be paying 
has arrived. A group that can "cut prices" -- offer milk of producers to 
handlers at prices less than that offered by the regular cooperatives --
may be the cooperatives' competition. If this be so ~- whether a rump 
group or not -- if the NFO is our competition, then it must be determined 
whether a group organized as a "non-profit" association, organized as a 
debating society (Knights of Columbus, Masons, Knights of Pythias, etc.) 
is free to engage in commercial competition with a cooperative. A coopera-
tive, some of you may say, is a ''non-profit" association because the law 
(in Ohio, 1729.0l(D) ) so provides. But the same statutes immediately 
proceed to strip from the cooperative most, perhaps all, of the advantages 
of "non-profit" status, particularly the tax paying aspect. All cooperatives 
pay franchise tax, personal property, and real property taxes as a regular 
corporation for profit; and now, in Cincinnati we find the Board of Review 
of the Cincinnati Income Tax Bureau finding that a cooperative must pay 
income tax as a corporation in spite of the provisions of 1729.0l(D). 
A nnon-profit11 corporation, as such, pays none of these taxes. 
In part' this question ~as pe~ .. P\ltbefote the Federal Court in Kansas 
Cit1,.~~tts'aW;4Y,tf) ba.'nd~a.~p $fC!~Pttl:leSe~r~tacy oftheState of 
.0~9$lt<>~.l.d l>~.~~rc~~ t~ q~~st~o~ -~~?-~~is'l~~P:·t to·•do:·~t.tsines$ ·.in OP.;Lo. ·····;~~.of 1;ll,~.•ti'-'~·.··.the B~lteed~~os·t·~~.nciw .is aiwther· .. ·r:eal good .ta~-· 
<:')~~!ft . ' 
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Any rump group will usually be found short of funds and any defense 
or action against them that forces the use and expenditure of money is a 
good way to deal with them. 
In dealing with the non-members, we are dealing with a different type 
problem. USDA protects and furthers the position of non-members (but what 
about labor - if non-union, no work on projects in which there are Federal 
Funds). Of course, those who profess membership in a rump group may be 
"non-members", and, as they are found to be shipping milk to market on 
routes nominally controlled by a cooperative, they should be treated as any 
other producer who is not a member of the milk marketing cooperative. If, 
in fact, a rump group producer has signed a contract with a cooperative, 
the opportunity to enforce it is there and he is not then a non-member. 
There are a few "thou shalt" o'r "thou shalt not" provisions in some phase 
of law. 
In the Internal Revenue Code we find these "shalt nots" and they pertain 
only to "tax exempt" status (that means the right or duty to allocate all 
receipts, as opposed to only receipts from marketing). 
Sec. 521 (1954 Code) and Sec. 1381 (Part I, Subchapter T) and appli-
cable rules provide: 
1. Exemption will not be denied if a cooperative does not do 
more business with producers who are not members than with 
producers who are members; and, 
2. Does not do more than 15 percent of its business with per-
sons who are not producers. (These same requirements are to 
be found in the Ohio Law at Sec. 1729.03(A). ) 
3. Now in the regulations (IRS) we find these words: Coopera-
tive dairy companies which are engaged in collecting milk 
and disposing of it or the products thereof and distributing 
the proceeds, less necessary operating expenses, among the 
producers upon the basis of either the guantity or the value 
of milk or of butterfat in the milk furnished by such pro-
ducers, are exempt from the tax. If the proceeds of the 
business are distributed in any other way than on such a 
proportionate basis, the association does not meet the 
requirements of the Code and is not exempt. In other words, 
non-member patrons must be treated the same as members inso-
far as the distribution of patronage dividends is concerned. 
Thus, if products are marketed for non-member producers, the 
proceeds of the sale, less necessary operating expenses, must 
be returned to the patrons from the sale of whose goods such 
proceeds result, whether or not such patrons are members of 
the association. 
I can easily translate this to read that you may not charge 
non-members more than members. 
Within the framework of these three points, then, it should be possible 
to devise a plan for including non-members in the marketing plans of cooper-
atives. Once this is done -- and it is the thing to do -- there is no longer 
an important non-member problem with which to cope. 
-13-
Haul their milk; test their milk; maintain normal quality checks; 
direct non-member milk with member milk on loads; collect and pay super-
pool. In short, do what you can on behalf of the non-member and -- if you 
can get hold of some of the money moving to him charge for the service. 
To fail to do these things could be "punitive" and unlawful. So be lawful 
and eliminate the problem. 
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PROSPECTS FOR LEGISLATION 
TO ADVANCE COLLECTIVE FARMER BARGAINING 
Dennis R. Henderson 
Assistant Professor, Agricultural Economics 
The Ohio State University 
Improving farmers' economic position through group action has been a 
long sought goal. Recently, however, considerably more attention has been 
focused upon bargaining than upon other forms of collective action. Today, 
I'll attempt to set the perspective for bargaining from the farmer's point 
of view, to review the status of bargaining legislation, and trace out the 
prospects for future legislation that will facilitate collective bargaining 
by farmers. 
Collective bargaining in agriculture is normally considered to be the 
negotiation of price and other terms of sale between an organized group of 
producers and the handlers or processors of the farm commodities they pro-
duce. There are several situations when collective bargaining is a viable 
alternative to the current market situation.l These include: 
1. Where one side of the market for a commodity is marked by 
high concentration of power, farmers may need to organize 
as a means of developing a degree of countervailing power. 
2. Where the open market-price discovery mechanism for a com-
modity has totally collapsed, as it virtually has in eggs, 
producer groups may be warranted in implementing some kind 
of bargaining system to determine price and other terms of 
trade. 
3. Where the processing and retailing systems rest heavily upon 
non-price competition such as promotion, product differenti-
ation and merchandising, trading conditions do not splice 
well with a farm marketing system oriented primarily toward 
price. Collective bargaining may be a feasible way to link 
the two unlike market systems. 
4. Where pricing of farm products has given away to contracts, 
particularly where contract-making has become a processor 
dominated activity, farmer bargaining cannot only improve 
equity, but also stability. 
5. Where a commodity suffers from recurrent cycles of overpro-
duction, the bargaining process, with adequate support by 
producers, could help stabilize production in line with 
demand. 
1For elaboration, see Breimyer, Harold F., "The Problem and Its Setting," 
in Bargaining in Agriculture-Potentials and Pitfalls of Collective Action, 
North Central Regional Extension Publication 30, University of Missouri 
Extension Div. C911, June, 1971, pp. 3-7. 
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6. Where the marketing system continues to seek a more orderly 
flow of commodities from the farm into the processing sector, 
bargaining may assist. While bargaining is not basically a 
product flow device, bargaining associations may use this as 
a means of achieving economic gains and strengthening their 
bargaining position. Certainly the dairy bargaining coopera-
tives have demonstrated this. 
Additionally, as it is a human trait to reason mainly by analogy, many 
farmers see promise in collective bargaining because they have witnessed suc-
cessful bargaining by labor unions. Much publicity is given to favorable 
wage settlements achieved through bargaining by labor unions. Such publicity 
has interested many in collective bargaining as a means for obtaininghigher 
prices. This possibility has not been lost on farmers, as indicated by their 
responses to questions concerning the best method for obtainingfairprices 
for grain and livestock (Table 1). You will note that the majority of pro-
ducers feel that some type of group action, including collective bargaining, 
is the most effective way to obtain fair prices for these commodities. 
This pro-bargaining attitude is particularly impressive in view of the 
relatively small amount of bargaining activity for these commodities in the 
past. On the other hand, however, some might argue that it is this lack of 
exposure to collective bargaining that explains its high regard with grain 
and livestock producers. 
While some farmers do not believe collective bargaining is the most 
effective way of gaining fair prices, the overwhelming majority feel that 
some form of collective bargaining in agriculture is generally desirable 
(Table 2). And, contrary to some professional opinions, there seems to be 
no strong feeling among producers that collective bargaining is applicable 
only for contract crops. Note that only a small percentage of farmers feel 
it has no place in agriculture. Thus, it is clear that most farmers do feel 
that there are advantages to collective bargaining in agriculture. When 
asked how they might achieve bargaining power, farmers are about evenly 
divided between those that prefer to organize and run their own bargaining 
groups without government help and those that feel some form of governmental 
involvement is desirable (Table 3). 
This sample is a little misleading, however, because there is not a 
clear cut dichotomy between some governmental involvement and none. Certainly, 
it takes some action, or at least overt inaction, by the government for 
farmers to organize an association that they operate themselves, if nothing 
more than enabling legislation such as the Capper-Volstead Act giving farmers 
the right to organize. Governmental involvement can stem from this extreme 
across a wide range of possibilities to, at the other end of the continuum, 
where the governmental unit conducts the bargaining on behalf of all parties 
and mandates prices and terms upon the entire industry. 
Several legislative measures have been enacted or proposed, both 
federally and within various states, that facilitate farmer bargaining some-
where along this continuum. First, I will review briefly the federal measures 
and then look at the status of bargaining legislation in a few states. 
The only significant federal legislation that has actually been enacted 
is the Agricultural Fair Practices Act of 1967. Essentially, this act pro-
vides for the protection of farmers' rights to organize and prevents 
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Table 1. Farmers' Responses to Various Methods 
of Obtaining "Fair" Prices for Grain and Livestock 
Method of Obtaining Fair Price 
Percent Responsea 
Livestock Grain 
Collective Bargaining Associations 
More Cooperative Marketing 
Present System with Price Supports 















aunweighted average of non-representative samples of Illinois and 
Missouri farmers. 
Source: Adapted from Guither, Harold D., "Bargaining in Agriculture 
-- Potentials and Pitfalls for Continuing Education Programs 
Among Livestock and Grain Producers," paper presented at 
the AAEA Annual Meeting, Gainesville, Florida, August 20-
23, 1972. 
Table 2. How Farmers View 
Collective Bargaining in Agriculture 
Percent Responsea 
Generally Desirable 
Desirable Only for Contract Crops 
Desirable Only with a Central Marketing Board 







aunweighted average of non-representative sample of Illinois and 
Missouri farmers. 
Source: Adapted from Guither, op. cit. 
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Table 3. Farmers' Responses to Various Methods 
of Achieving Bargaining Power 
Percent Responsesa 
Farmers Organize and Run Their Own Associations 
Organize Bargaining Associations with Government 
to Enforce Rules 






aunweighted average of non-representative sample of Illinois and 
Missouri farmers. 
Source: Adapted from Guither, op. cit. 
discriminatory practices on the part of buyers due to a producer's member-
ship in an organization. There is no provision in this act that requires 
buyers to deal with a producer association, but based upon limited evidence, 
it does appear that discrimination by handlers against producer groups will 
be reduced under its provisions. 
There are four additional bills that have been introduced in Congress. 
These cover a range beginning where the Fair Practices Act leaves off, 
extending to price committees with authority to set production levels and 
determine prices. 
The Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act, better known as the May 
Bill, would extend the Fair Practices Act of 1967 to make it unlawful for 
a handler or processor to refuse to negotiate prices or other terms of 
trade with farmer bargaining associations. It defines a bargaining associa-
tion as a group of producers which has as its principal function, as an 
agent of the producers, the negotiation with handlers of prices and other 
terms of contracts with respect to production, sale or marketing of agri-
cultural products. A key phrase in this definition is that the association 
has as its principal function to bargain on behalf of its members. Note 
that this does not exclude it from engaging in other activities such as 
distributing product, disposing of surplus production, operating a supply 
pool, or the like. I will refer to the importance of this provision later. 
Nothing included in this bill provides for the certification of bargaining 
associations, supervision of the bargaining process, or the arbitration of 
disputes, and the measure would not compel handlers and associations to 
reach an agreement. 
Governmental involvement in bargaining under the provisions of this 
bill would be minimal. Much of the opposition to this bill seems to stem, 
in fact, from this minimum involvement. Proponents of bargaining legisla-
tion argue that the bill does not go far enough toward providing for a 
suitable outcome of the bargaining process. Some have also been concerned 
that processing cooperatives are not specifically excluded from the handler 
category. There seems to be relatively little possibility that this bill 
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will be enacted, particularly in view of the lack of support among bargain-
ing proponents. 
The legislative proposal that has received the most attention in the 
current session of Congress is a bill entitled the National Agricultural 
Marketing and Bargaining Act, more commonly referred to as the Sisk Bill. 
This bill creates a national agricultural marketing board, provides stand-
ards for accrediting associations of producers and defines the mutal obli-
gations of bargaining associations and handlers. The act requires good 
faith bargaining on commodities produced under contract and makes it unlaw-
ful for a handler to negotiate with other producers of a given commodity 
while negotiating with a qualified bargaining association. The association 
has recourse to the bargaining board if handlers refuse to bargain. There 
is nothing in the bill that obligates either party to agree to any proposal 
or make any concession. Also included is a provision exempting processing 
cooperatives from the status of handler and another that prevents handlers 
from combining or conspiring with one another in bargaining with qualified 
associations. That is, associations must bargain with handlers individually 
as handlers would be prevented from combining to bargain jointly with an 
association of producers. These two provisions, I believe, require careful 
analysis. 
Obviously, cooperative processors would prefer to be excluded from 
the bargaining process and have been a powerful lobby in favor of this 
provision. By excluding processing cooperatives from the bargaining 
requirement, they gain a definite comparative advantage, vis-a-vis their 
non-cooperative competitors. I well realize that philosophically the 
cooperative processor is an off-farm extension of the farm enterprise, and 
as such, the sum-gain to the producer from his processing cooperative 
should be as large as his sum-gain from bargaining with non-cooperative 
handlers. Thus, the producer should be indifferent toward bargaining if 
he is shipping to his cooperatively owned processing plant, and the proces-
sor can be exempted from bargaining. In practice, however, it doesn't 
work that way. There are many good examples that processing and high returns 
to the producers aren't compatible. The inclination of directors of coopera-
tives when they have an investment in processing facilities is not much 
different from directors of other firms with similar facilities. They tend 
to concentrate on profitable operation of the processing facility, even 
if it means low returns to their producer-members. Thus, exempting the 
cooperative whose primary business is processing from bargaining could 
give it a substantial competitive cost advantage with little, if any, 
economic gain to its producers. 
This seems somewhat unfair to non-cooperative processors. This prob-
lem could be overcome by adopting the language similar to that in the May 
Bill, which would allow bargaining associations to participate in some 
aspects of product handling as long as the principal function of the associa-
tion is bargaining for its members. Bargaining associations could then 
engage in supply management programs necessary to enhance their bargaining 
position, as many dairy cooperatives now do, yet an unfair competitive 
advantage would not be created for those cooperatives whose primary function 
is processing. 
My second concern is With the language preventing handlers from com-
bining to deal uniformly with a bargaining association. If handlers cannot 
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act in concert, a bargaining group could arrange different and non-uniform 
terms and prices with different handlers. This could put some handlers at 
a disadvantage vis-a-vis others with regard to procurement costs and other 
terms of trade. Furthermore, it seems philosophically inconsistent to 
grant rights which substantially increase the bargaining power of one group; 
that is, the producers, without granting similar power to the parties on 
the other side of the bargaining table. 
Other important provisions of the Sisk Bill that deserve mention are 
the provision for assessment of member dues to be withheld by the handler 
and the extension of market orders under the Marketing Agreement Act of 
1937 to additional commodities. 
All things considered, legislation similar to the Sisk Bill probably 
has the best chance of being enacted by a subsequent Congress, but enact-
ment is not likely until some of these key issues are resolved. 
The remaining two bills in the federal hopper are the National Agri-
cultural Bargaining Act and the National Agricultural Marketing Act, better 
known as the Mondale Bills. The bargaining bill establishes a board that 
would supervise, upon petition, the election of commodity marketing commit-
tees which would be responsible for negotiating on behalf of all producers 
of that commodity prices and other terms with representatives of prospective 
purchasers. Provisions are also included for the board, in conjunction 
with marketing committees, to determine for any commodity an amount that 
may be produced in any marketing period and to allocate that quantity 
among producers. This supply control provision raises some serious ques-
tions, the answers to which are not included in the bill. How can the 
equitable distribution of marketing rights among existing producers be 
assured? Also, how can undue barriers to the entry of new producers be 
prevented? There are no provisions in the bill to assure an equitable 
distribution of marketing rights among existing producers or the assign-
ment of such rights from one producer to another or to potential entrants. 
In overcoming this problem, it is important to design a mechanism whereby 
the value of the future stream of income generated by the marketing rights 
is not capitalized into the current value of that right. Too often that 
happens, and only the original owner receives any financial benefit from 
the establishment of such rights, thus benefiting only existing producers 
and not future producers. It is most difficult to design a system that 
would prevent the capitalization of future income into a given asset; 
witness tobacco marketing rights. Thus, the chances for adoption of this 
provision with an assurance of equity for both existing and future farmers 
appears somewhat dim. 
The second Mondale Bill, the National Agricultural Marketing Act, would 
remove exemptions in the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 for 
certain agricultural commodities, thus extending the market order provisions 
of that act. It further provides a method for establishing collective bar-
gaining in good faith between producers or associations of producers within 
a market order and handlers or groups of handlers with whom they deal. 
Minimum prices and other terms of trade so negotiated would become binding 
upon all handlers when agreed to by handlers acquiring 50 percent of the 
commodity sold by the producers in the market order area in the preceding 
year. 
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The major distinction between this bill and the Mondale bargaining 
bill is that it covers only producers in a given market order area, whereas 
the bargaining bill would extend mandatory coverage to all producers of a 
given commodity. Therefore, under the marketing act, producers in one area 
could be covered by collective bargaining and market order provisions while 
those in another area might not be covered or be subject to different agree-
ments. Thus, under this provision, producers in a given market order area 
would be subject to the types of inter-regional competition that have 
increasingly caused problems for dairy producer associations under the 
dairy marketing orders. I question the wisdom of legislating similar types 
of inter-regional problems for other commodities. 
An additional provision in the Mondale marketing act allows the 
Secretary of Agriculture to set forth production and/or marketing rights, 
a provision to which I would again raise the question of equity and fair-
ness to existing and potential producers. 
It is now obvious that there is a wide range of provisions to facili-
tate collective bargaining set forth in the various legislative proposals 
being considered by Congress. None of these proposals exists free of 
serious questions concerning the performance that would result from their 
enactment. Until these questions of equity, fairness, and flexibility are 
resolved, enactment is not likely. 
I would like to turn now from federal legislation to collective 
farmer bargaining laws and proposals in a few key states. From these, 
some implications can be drawn concerning the likelihood of future legis-
lation, the types of provisions that might be encompassed in such legisla-
tion, and some strategies that might be used by proponents for securing 
such legislation. 
California is probably the leading state with regard to farm bargain-
ing legislation. That state has enacted laws that cover specific commodities 
with what are essentially state marketing orders, the terms of which are 
bargained over between producers and handlers. The provisions are quite 
similar to those in the Mondale marketing bill. Under the California 
measure, the state department of agriculture oversees bargaining between 
accredited producer groups and handlers or groups of handlers. When handlers 
who, in total, account for a prescribed percentage of the total purchases 
of a commodity agree to a given price, that price then becomes a legal price 
and all handlers are obligated to this as a minimum. The system seems to 
operate reasonably well for those specialty crops grown in California for 
which there is relatively little competition from other regions. Its 
applicability to other commodities would be limited, as is any regional 
marketing order or bargaining scheme, by the possibility of in-shipments 
from competing areas. At the present time, there are no reports of addi-
tional farmer bargaining legislation being considered in that state. 
In Ohio, collective bargaining legislation has been proposed in 
House Bill No. 838. This is somewhat similar to the Sisk Bill. Essen-
tially, it establishes a state bargaining board to oversee the bargaining 
process, sets standards for bargaining associations, and makes it unlawful 
for a handler to refuse to bargain in good faith with an accredited producer 
association. Other unfair practices are outlined which make discrimination 
unlawful and assure a fair game. In the Ohio proposal, membership in a 
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bargaining association is voluntary and the handler is not obligated to 
deal with non-members on the same terms as he agreed to with the associa-
tion, although he would be prohibited from offering a higher price to 
non-members than to members. This provision does, however, open the door 
for free riders; that is, non-members could receive the same favorable 
terms achieved by the bargaining association, yet would not be obligated 
to share in the costs of the bargaining effort. 
The Ohio bill specifically exempts processing cooperatives from the 
status of handler and on this point is subject to the same criticism as 
the Sisk Bill. This bill was killed in a house committee in the 1972 
session of the Ohio General Assembly, but will undoubtedly be reintro-
duced again, and with some modification, stands a reasonably good chance 
of being enacted. 
One of the most interesting state proposals is Michigan Senate Bill 
No. 1225, known as the Michigan Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining 
Act. Like the Ohio proposal, the Michigan bill calls for the establish-
ment of a bargaining board, sets standards for accrediting producer 
associations, and outlines unfair bargaining practices. Unlike the Ohio 
bill, however, the Michigan proposal creates what is essentially a union 
shop. Under the Michigan proposal, when a majority of the producers 
representing at least 50 percent of the commodity sales agree to be repre-
sented by an association, then all producers of that commodity in the 
defined marketing area are bound by the actions of the association. This 
eliminates the free rider problem. Additionally, the union shop provision 
gives additional bargaining strength to the association as it speaks for 
all producers of a commodity in a given area rather than its members only. 
The bill also sets up a formal procedure for adjudication of disputes. 
This is a provision not included in most other legislative proposals, but 
conceivably is an important ingredient to the long-run success of collective 
bargaining by farmers. The Michigan arbitration procedure calls for each 
party to a dispute to submit a final offer. A tripartite board then 
selects one for a binding solution. 
Just a note on this provision. Such a procedure could very easily 
lead to the development of gamesmanship more than the achievement of 
satisfactory solutions as each party attempts to pursue a strategy that will 
lead to acceptance of their offer rather than the opposition's offer. It 
is doubtful if either party's final offer would be completely just. More 
likely, a satisfactory solution contains elements of the offers made by 
each party and the appropriate adjudication procedure would be to have an 
impartial party, such as an arbitration board, arrive at a compromise 
solution. The Michigan bill also has the common, but troublesome, exemp-
tion for producer cooperatives primarily engaged in processing from the 
handler status. This bill has passed the Michigan Senate, has been 
reported out of the House Labor Committee, and is currently before the 
House where it is rated as a "toss-up." 
It is interesting to look briefly at the sources of support for and 
opposition to this type of legislation. The strongest support in Michigan 
has come from (1) the Michigan Farm Bureau, which views this type of 
legislation as a means of strengthening their position as a representa-
tive of all farmers, (2) from the vegetable and fruit producers, who have 
been under substantial economic pressure and feel a strong need for higher 
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prices, and (3) from organized labor. Labor interests in general support 
collective bargaining legislation as they view this as part of the rules of 
a fair game. The natural opposition to farmer bargaining legislation 
comes from processors and other handlers of raw agricultural commodities. 
In Michigan, the opposition has been led by the food retailers association. 
The Michigan food retailers association, however, is strongly influenced 
by large integrated retailers who are also processors. Processors 
generally feel that they will lose the most if their suppliers gain 
increased bargaining power. 
Additional opposition has come from the Livestock Feeders Association, 
whose members view themselves largely as processors, buying their inputs 
-- feed and feeder livestock -- from farmers who would gain bargaining 
strength through such a measure. Opposition has also come from smaller 
cooperatives and bargaining units such as the National Farmers Organiza-
tion, who feel that the union shop provision strengthens the position of 
the larger farmer organizations to the detriment of their own associations. 
This is a concern based upon a solid foundation. Certainly, the larger 
the bargaining association is, the more effective it can be on behalf 
of its producer-members. Thus, the quest for effective bargaining by 
farmers will generate increased interest in large organizations. The 
moving forces behind most future efforts to support collective bargaining 
legislation will undoubtedly come from the large organizations, such as 
the Farm Bureau and the major dairy cooperatives. Additional support 
seems likely to be forthcoming from organized labor and, indeed, it seems 
that a viable coalition between labor and agricultural interests might 
not only be feasible, but also desirable for securing future legislation. 
Looking again to national legislation, what are the chances for a 
stronger farmer bargaining law emerging in the near future? The Sisk 
Bill was killed in the House Agricultural Sub-Committee on Domestic ~~r­
keting and Consumer Relations by a three to five vote in mid-September. 
The three to five vote is significant in that Congressman Foley, the 
chairman of the sub-committee, voted against the measure even though he 
didn't have to vote and his negative vote was not required to defeat the 
measure. This is a strong indicator that there is no chance for early 
revival of this bill in Congress. As the Sisk Bill has received the most 
favorable response in this committee, it is doubtful if the other proposals 
will be seriously considered by this Congress. 
Chances of bargaining legislation don't appear to be particularly 
good in the upcoming sessions of Congress. First, there is no language 
supporting collective bargaining for farmers in the official platform of 
the Republican Party and no serious support in the Democratic Platform. 
Thus, it would appear that neither party is really committed to push for 
bargaining legislation in the near future. Furthermore, collective bar-
gaining will probably not receive favorable attention by Congress unless 
there is a great deal of pressure upon them from farmers. Farmers cannot 
be expected to exert much pressure for price relief when their incomes 
are relatively high. In 1972, farm incomes set an all-time record high 
and the outlook for 1973 is again for relatively high incomes. There-
fore, there isn't much reason to believe that farmers will pressure for 
any type of new price-improvement legislation, including bargainingt until 
they are again in a tight income situation. This will probably not occur 
until 1974, at the earliest. 
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MOst farmers place great value upon the traditional freedom of making 
their own decisions about what they will sell and what price they will 
accept. As long as their incomes are reasonably satisfactory, they will 
undoubtedly opt to preserve this freedom rather than to bargain it away 
in order to realize monetary gains. With a period of two years or more 
likely before serious pressures again mount for enactment of bargaining 
legislation, the burden falls directly upon those of us concerned with the 
equity of the farmer's economic position in today's society vis-a-vis 
those with whom he deals to come up with provisions and proposals for 
collective bargaining legislation that will overcome the serious objec-
tions to current proposals, and that will be fair, equitable, and opera-
tionally feasible. 
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE NMPF SUPPLY MANAGEMENT PROPOSAL 
Robert E. Jacobson 
Professor, Agricultural Economics 
The Ohio State University 
We only have to look at the current phase of the milk production 
cycle to know whether or not the dairy industry is interested again in 
production controls. At the present time (autumn, 1972), we appear to be 
in the middle of a substantial expansion in milk supplies, and no apparent 
let-up is in sight. After bottoming out at 116.3 billion pounds in 1969 
at the conclusion of our last cycle, milk production has been increasing 
steadily each year and will approximate 120.6 billion pounds in 1972. 
Preliminary estimates suggest another 1-billion-pound increase in 1973. 
The concern of milk producers, of course, extends to the price impli-
cations of supply expansion. In spite of expanded supplies, producer 
prices have continued their upward movement since 1969. The Ohio producer 
pay price for all milk will be about $6.30 per cwt. in 1972, up by 17 
cents from 1971, and 54 cents higher than the $5.76 per cwt. price 
recorded in 1969. While this appears to fly in the face of economic 
principles of pricing, given the greater supply, it is the time lag 
questions that we don't have good answers for. How sensitive are current 
prices to current supplies? How soon are production decisions made and 
implemented in relation to significant price changes? I think it is fair 
to say now that the attention supply management is drawing in the milk 
industry is primarily related to a collective estimation that (1) produc-
tion increases are now occurring because of significant price increases 
that extend back into the mid-60's, (2) current price strength means even 
a further extension of the production cycle upwards, and (3) production 
controls may be essential as a means of protecting the present price 
level. 
Even here in Ohio, where we have seen a considerable shift away from 
milk production since 1955, the new enthusiasm for milk production has 
been registering itself. In 1971, for the first time in a decade, we saw 
more milk produced in Ohio than was produced in the previous year. And 
in 1972, Ohio production is surging even more (plus 3 percent), and we'll 
be at around the 4.6 billion pound mark for the year. When we see this 
recent push in milk production in an area where grain and livestock 
enterprises have been replacing a lot of dairy, then we have to believe 
that the strength in producer milk prices is generating a supply situation 
that could be distressing to the milk industry. 
The one major consideration that has taken a lot of the edge off the 
increasing milk supply situation has been the recent strength in commer-
cial sales of milk and dairy products. Most of us have been pleasantly 
surprised by the favorable demand picture. Overall, it now appears that 
commercial disappearance of milk in all dairy products will increase by 
nearly 3 perc:nt in 1972. And for the first time in many years, per capita 
consumption w1ll go up slightly (562 pounds m.e.) instead of going down 
substantially. Cheese and the low fat skim fluid products lead the parade, 
but most other dairy products are also doine well in thp, t"nmmArl"istl market. 
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The increase in demand has been such that, even with more milk production, 
CCC purchases in 1972 will be down markedly from 1971. Price support 
purchases in 1971 amounted to 7.3 billion pounds, but they will drop to 
less than 6 billion pounds in 1972. This cost relief to the support pro-
gram will, in itself, remove pressures for supply management. 
However, the milk industry, particularly as expressed through the 
National Milk Producers Federation, continues to sense the responsibility 
for evaluating alternative means of managing the national milk supply. 
As a minimum, it is recognized that even the enabling legislation or 
potential machinery for supply management do not exist and that exposure 
to possibilities in this direction are essential. While most members of 
the Ohio Milk Producers Federation at this seminar have had a chance to 
review the NMPF proposal, the same probably is not true for participants 
of the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation. I therefore propose to (1) describe 
the basic elements of the ~~F proposal, (2) consider the base valuation 
question in some detail$ and (3) leave most of the implications discussion 
to Bob Brewer and Eldie Vickrey. 
In order to control farm production, you obviously have to have par-
ticipation by producers. There are two routes to get participation --
(1) voluntary, with incentive, and (2) mandatory, with penalties. The 
NMPF proposal essentially adopts the mandatory route, although the proposal 
asks only for enabling legislation that would permit scheduling of a 
referendum on the issue among milk producers. 
The referendum issue would be defined in terms of two options. The 
options would be either (1) a 75 percent of parity price support without 
production controls, or (2) an 86 to 90 percent of parity price support 
with production controls. At the present time, the 86 to 90 percent 
option would mean a price support level a little more than $1.00 per cwt. 
higher than the 75 percent option. 
Seven basic provisions of the supply management proposal are noted: 
1. The recent three-year history of marketings would be 
reported for each producer. 
2. Bases would be extended to all producers selling 50,000 
pounds or more of milk annually. 
3. Bases would be extended to both Grade A milk and manu-
facturing grade milk. 
4. The Secretary of Agriculture would announce a national 
quota each year. 
5. The national quota percentage would be applied to the 
individual history of marketings in order to establish 
an individual ~· 
6. A penalty price would be placed on over-base marketings. 
7. Bases would be transferable among producers. 
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The combination of (1) an individual producer's history of marketin~s 
with (2) a national quota would provide for (3) the individual producer's 
~· 
1. History of Marketings -- A history of marketings would be estab-
lished for each producer based on the amount of milk he marketed during 
the immediately preceding three years. By way of example, if the program 
was now in operation, we can assume the following situation for establish-
ing 1972 base for a Mr. Producer. 




Average = 2,000 lbs. 
In this example, the 1972 history of marketings would equal 2,000 
pounds. In 1973, the history would be based on the 1970-71-72 period 
and so on. Also, at the outset of such a program, the history average 
would be determined in the first year only on the preceding year's mar-
ketings, the second year on a two-year average, and the third year on a 
full three-year average. 
2. National quota -- The second step in assigning base would be up 
to the Secretary of Agriculture. Each year, the Secretary would (1) esti-
mate U. S. milk production for the coming year, and (2) estimate how much 
milk is actually required for the commercial market and other priority 
needs. The national quota would be determined from these two estimates. 
An example for 1972 will help us here: 
Estimated production for 1972 - 120 bil. lbs. 
Estimated needs for 1972 - 114 bil. lbs. 
114 bil. lbs. National quota would equal 120 bil. lbs. = 95 percent 
3. ~ -- The quota announced by the Secretary would then be applied 
to each individual's history of marketings. For our Mr. Producer with his 
2,000-pound-per-day history of marketings, 95 percent, or 1,900 pounds 
would be assigned as base, and all milk sold in excess of the 1,900 pounds 
would be defined as excess milk subject to a penalty price. The base milk 
would enjoy the high 86-90 percent of parity support, and monthly pay 
prices would be determined in the same way they presently are calculated. 
The penalty price for milk over base would finally be at such a level as 
to discourage over base milk production. This might require penalty 
prices for milk in Ohio as low as $3.00 per cwt. The average total cost 
of producing milk in Ohio has recently been about $5.40 per cwt. Approxi-
mately 60 percent of this cost, or $3.25, is out-of-pocket cost. Unless 
the penalty price for milk is equal to or less than the out-of-pocket 
cost of producing milk, there won't be a significant cut-back in milk pro-
duction. 
If the base price for Grade A milk in Ohio markets was $6.50 per cwt., 
and a price for over base milk of $3.00 per cwt. was established, the $3.50 
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difference would be remitted to the U. S, Department of Agriculture. The 
Department would use this money to help pay for costs of the dairy price 
support program. 
Thus far, only a general approach has been worked out, and many ques-
tions don't have answers yet. But some key issues can be discussed. 
1. It is intended that if the supply management program was approved 
in referendum, it would continue indefinitely until conditions indicated 
that a new referendum would be appropriate. 
2. Bases would be transferable among dairy farmers within the same 
state or from a producer in one state to a producer in an adjoining state. 
3. New producers could acquire base by purchasing existing base or 
by building their own base. To build base, the new producer's history of 
marketings would be established at 50 percent of his marketings in his 
first year, and he would gradually build his history until he was on the 
same basis as all other producers in his fourth year of production. 
4. Bases could acquire substantial values. A wide difference between 
the base price and the penalty price would be the key factor in high base 
prices. However, the three-year moving average to be used in determining 
the history of marketings would dilute base values somewhat because a pro-
ducer could build rather than buy base. 
5. It is proposed that the national quota be applied uniformly across 
the United States. In areas where milk supplies are deficit, the feasibility 
and acceptability of such an approach is a real question mark. 
We can leave these matters to discussion. I want to turn now to the 
matter of base valuation. Since the incidence of bases has been pretty 
remote to us here in Ohio, I believe there's some point to laying out the 
concept and an approach to base valuation. Of course, bases take on value 
because you can get a better price for your milk with base than without 
base. But how do we translate that price advantage into a fairly precise 
idea of what base in worth? 
Three factors are relevant to the valuation of base. These include: 
(1) the anticipated difference between the base price and the excess price; 
(2) the length of time that it is expected that base will have value; and 
(3) the degree of certainty that the base plan will last through that period. 
1. Difference Between Base Price and Excess Price 
The two large fluid milk pools in Ohio are currently both running about 
67 percent Class I utilization. The Class I prices are near $7.05 per cwt. 
and the Class II-III prices are near $5.04 per cwt. As a result, blend 
prices of $6.38 per cwt. are being generated. 
With a base plan, and with the market base fixed at the Class I volume 
plus 20 percent, and with the Class prices as presently noted, then 
(a) the base price would be $6.72 per cwt. 
(b) the excess price would be $5.04 per cwt. 
(c) the difference equals $1.68 per cwt. or 1.68 cents 
per pound. 
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2. Duration of Time that Base Will Have Value 
While most groups moving into base plan operations probably will expect 
an extended period of time for base plan operation, the three-year moving 
average used for the history of marketings can be interpreted to mean that 
a given "pound of daily base" will have a three-year life. This means that 
base values are to be calculated in terms of a three-year life. After all, 
in periods of longer than three years, bases are earned merely by performance 
on the market. 
3. Probability that Base Plan Will Stick 
Since only a three-year period is relevant in evaluating the base value 
question, the buyer and the seller of base are both pretty well assured that 
the base plan will last at least that long. There is therefore close to a 
100 percent probability factor that can be used in valuing base. 
We can now raise the specific question: "What is the value of one 
pound of daily base?" 
given --
(a) Difference= 1.68 cents per pound 
(b) Time period = 3 years 
(c) Degree of certainty = 100 percent 
(d) Cost of capital, or interest rate = 8 percent 
The value of one pound of daily base in a one-year period could be 
figured as follows: 
1.68 cents per pound per day x 365 days = $6.132 per pound of daily 
base for a one-year period, 
Then, the present value of one pound of daily base for a three-year 

























pound of daily 
base 
In this procedure, we are trying to find out how much money we can 
afford to invest now and come out even on that investment in three years. 
In effect, by investing $15.81 per pound of daily base today, we will break 
even with the ($6.132) (3 years) or $18.40 return we will get from the base 
milk in three years. The eight percent cost of capital compounded over the 
three-year period reduces the amount that we can afford to invest rather 
substantially. 
I have outlined an approach to base valuation. In an actual market 
situation, buyers and sellers of base probably won't attempt to delineate 
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the factors and assumptions as we have done. However, it is a good bet 
that the value bases take on won't be too far from the $15.81 estimate that 
we have made. Actual values in our Ohio markets would be under the $15.81 
estimate, largely because something less than 100 percent certainty will be 
attached to the valuation procedure. 
As for the future for supply management in the milk industry, I believe 
five observations are in order: 
1. We are in the third year of milk production increases in the 
U. S. (1970, 71, and 72), and it appears that production will 
continue to increase for at least two more years. 
2. Unless the current strength in commercial sales of milk and 
dairy products is a longer run phenomenon than we now recog-
nize, surpluses of dairy products moving to the CCC will 
increase. 
3. There is every likelihood that after several years of produ-
cer price increases, a plateau in producer prices will be 
reached in 1973. 
4. The net effect of increasing production, stable demand, grow-
ing surpluses, and a static price situation will lead to a 
lot of discussion about base plans. 
5. If history is any guide to industry-wide acceptance of supply 
management, it is not likely that any comprehensive base plan 
will be implemented. 
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ADJUSTMENTS NEEDED IN THE N.M.P.F. SUPPLY MANAGEMENT PROPOSED PROGRAM 
Robert Brewer 
President 
Cincinnati Cooperative Milk Sales Association 
I do not want to imply~ in this discussion, that I am negative to a 
supply management program. Quite the contrary, I am in favor of such a 
program. Basically, the proposed program can add more order and system to 
our manner of milk marketing. The purpose of a supply management program 
is to tailor, somewhat, total production to meet the demands of the commer-
cial market plus domestic and foreign government program needs. And in so 
doing, the program itself creates conditions conducive to satisfactory 
prices for dairy farmers. 
Dairy Situation-- First Seven Months of 1972: 
Milk production up 1-1/2 percent (on a daily average basis) in 1972 
so far, compared to the first seven months of 1971, is estimated in total 
for 1972 at 120.5 billion pounds. This is up approximately two billion 
pounds this year. 
Commercial disappearance of milk in all dairy products through July of 
this year increased by 2-1/2 percent. If that rate of increase holds for 
the year the increase in commercial needs would be 2.7 billion pounds this 
year. Total commercial disappearance of milk in 1972 would then be 111.7 
billion pounds up from 109.0 billion in 1971. 
USDA purchases of dairy products are down so far this year. Estimates 
are that total purchases will be down one billion pounds from the 7.3 bil-
lion pounds of milk equivalent in 1971. 
Milk prices received by all farmers are up 2-1/2 percent from last 
year. Dairy farm cash receipts are estimated at $7.1 billion in 1972, up 
from $6.8 in 1971. 
Prices received by farmers for all milk is 16 cents per cwt. over this 
time last year, but 28 cents less in parity equivalency. Four points of 
parity have been lost to higher costs to farmers. 
Dairy imports this year will exceed the 1.3 billion pounds in 1971. 
Exports of dairy products are down because C.C.C. butter exports ceased. 
World butter output is up, along with milk production. 
But to make a point, regardless of conditions at any one point in timel 
I believe a Supply Management Program should be implemented for the benefit 
of dairy farmers. 
My assignment is to note needed adjustments in the proposal now under 
consideration: 
1. The first provision of the NMPF proposal needing further 
consideration is the section of the proposed program pro-
viding for the determination of History of Marketings. 
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"A history of marketings would be determined for each dairy 
farmer or for two or more farmers producing milk from the 
same production facility." 
I suggest that in the landlord-tenant arrangement, the 
history of marketings and the subsequent quota should be 
established for the farm rather than individuals. I believe 
this would be fair to all concerned. The tenant would have 
vested interests in 50 percent of the quota and would sell 
his 50 percent of the quota and leave it with the farm upon 
leaving such farm. Otherwise, it would create disorder. 
Such is the case with tobacco bases relative to tenant and 
landlord arrangements. 
2. Quota for each Dairy Farmer: 
The Secretary determines a marketing percentage by dividing 
the estimated national quota by the total of the histories 
of marketings. 
This marketing percentage is then applied to each dairy 
farmer's history of marketings without exception to estab-
lish the individual quotas. 
I suggest that this provision needs further study as to 
application to local market needs. 
As it now stands, unnecessary costs, both to producers and 
handlers, would be created. This is particularly true in 
high utilization markets. And more and more, it appears 
that even a 65 or 70 percent Class I utilization may not 
represent an adequate supply. 
3. Assessment on Deliveries in Excess of Quota: 
Irrespective of method of payment, a farmer would receive 
a net $2.00 per cwt. for over quota milk under the NMPF 
proposal. 
Inequities exist in this provision in that cost of produc-
tion varies by region; therefore, at $2.00 per cwt., 
producers in areas of high production and lower costs would 
experience less costs to produce over quota milk than pro-
ducers in areas having higher production costs. And again, 
this procedure would tend to shorten supplies in areas hav-
ing higher demands for fluid milk sales. 
4. A supply management program that would perform on behalf of 
producer interests wanting to hold production in line with 
demand and administered by the government for a consistent 
length of time would further negate the influence of govern-
ment support prices. If the need for surplus purchases is 
removed, the need, or at least most of the need, for support 
prices is removed. This is one more reason why it will be a 
difficult task to implement the program. 
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This program as proposed can be voted out, after being accepted; there-
fore, the need for the support price program must not be jeopardized. 
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THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED INDIANA CLASS I BASE PLAN 
ON OHIO MILK SHEDS AND MARKETS 
Eldie K. Vickrey 
General Manager 
Miami Valley Milk Producers Association 
The title of the subject the program committee assigned to me can be 
discussed in a very few words. I could merely say it isn't going to have 
an impact on Ohio milk sheds and markets. But human nature being what it 
is, someone would say, 11Why? 11 , and that is what I will discuss with you 
during the next few minutes. 
Perhaps a little background information about Class I base plans 
would be helpful. The Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 authorized Class I 
base plans for the first time in the history of Federal milk orders, amend-
ing the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, and it was to be 
effective through December 31, 1969. 
The Puget Sound marketing area in the state of Washington had been 
working on a Class I base provision for their market and lobbied for the 
legislation to establish Class I base plans under Federal orders. They 
thought this would remedy their surplus problem. Their Class I utiliza-
tion at the time was approximately 45-50 percent. A hearing and referen-
dum was held and a Class I base plan became effective in the Puget Sound 
order in September, 1967. 
A hearing was held on the Southeastern Florida order. A recommended 
decision was rendered by the Department denying a Class I base plan because 
no surplus situation existed. Thus, it appears to me that USDA's interpre-
tation of Congress' intent was to deny Class I base plans to markets that 
did not have a surplus problem. 
The Agriculture Act of 1970 continued authorization for Class I base 
plans until December 31, 1973, and provided that Class I base plans in 
effect prior to December 3, 1973, could be extended beyond that date, but 
not past December 31, 1976. The Agriculture Act of 1970 also made several 
changes in the Class I base plan, including the requirement that a producer's 
base would automatically be updated each year. Also, a plant becoming 
regulated by Federal orders with a Class I base plan would automatically 
provide bases, the same as producers already shipping under the order and, 
of course, several other changes. But these are two of the provisions of 
the Class I base plan that had the most effect on the decision relative 
to the proposed Class I base plan for Indiana Order 49. 
Following the history-making events that took place when the President 
and Secretary of Agriculture were announcing the parity prices of milk in 
March, 1971, for the 71-72 year, considerable interest developed in the 
states west of Ohio, particularly where there had been large coop mergers 
(A.M.P.I.-MID AM) in holding a hearing on a Class I base plan. The theory 
was advanced that this would be a means of controlling production and pre-
serve the markets from outside pressure if a large surplus of milk developed 
in the heavy producing states. 
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Producers generally do not like controls and the Chicago Order 30, 
Central Illinois Order 50, and Southern Illinois Order 32 soon cooled to 
the idea of a Class I base plan for their orders. The coops in the Indiana 
Order 49 continued to have discussions. The idea of a Class I base plan 
was promoted in producer meetings of certain cooperatives. In our own 
meetings, we attempted to discuss the provisions of the Class I base plan 
without trying to influence the producers one way or the other, and the only 
actual plan in operation that had experience that we could cite was the 
Puget Sound Area, where production continued to increase faster than sales. 
Therefore, the Class I utilization percentage was continuing to drop. 
It finally was decided that a proposal should be submitted to USDA 
for the Indiana Area. The Hoosier Milk Marketing Agency, Inc., a federated 
group of coops supplying milk in the Indiana area, submitted a proposal to 
the Department for consideration. They replied, and I quote, "Several 
aspects of the plan are questionable under the statute or appear ambiguous" 
and invited us to Washington to discuss the proposals, We met with several 
members of the Department, and I think I am safe in saying that the Depart-
ment does not like Class I base plans, and maybe rightly so. I don't think 
it is for me to judge: However, making judgements is a favorite pasttime 
of most of us. Following the meeting with the Department, it was decided 
that to change the proposals to conform with the Department's interpreta-
tions and have a hearing that any recommended decision the Department would 
issue would surely be voted down in a referendum. This is the one provision 
of Federal orders that requires an individual producer vote; that is to say 
one man- one vote, and the coops couldn't block vote their membership. 
After our final meeting on proposals, one of the coops had a membership 
meeting in the Indiana Area and took a secret ballot after explaining the 
proposals and the vote was approximately 3 to 2 against asking for a hearing 
on the proposals. 
Now here are some of the other reasons that we felt it would not be 
in the best interest of the producers supplying milk to Order 49, to attempt 
to put a Class I base plan into that order. Producers supplying a plant 
that became regulated under an order with a Class I base plan would be 
provided bases immediately, determined on their past deliveries. If this 
were a pool distributing plant that became regulated because of its sales, 
it would bring with it both producer milk and Class I sales. It would, 
therefore, depend on the plant's utilization as to whether it improved or 
hurt the producers already in the market. However, a supply plant could 
attach itself to the market and add sizeable amounts of producer milk to 
the market without any offsetting Class I sales and the producer would be 
given a base immediately according to his production history. In another 
situation, a producer that had been shipping to a non-pool plant would be 
assigned a production history effective the first day of the second month 
following the month in which he began delivery of producer milk to a pool 
plant. This would be done on the same basis as if he had been a producer 
under the order and his deliveries to the non-pool plant had been deliveries 
to the pool plant under which he started shipping. 
The proposals provided that bases be allocated on the basis of 120 per-
cent of the Class I sales during August through December. This total, 
divided by the total production history base would be the Class I base 
percentage and the new bases would become effective February 1 of each year. 
As you can see, if production increases faster than Class I sales or if 
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additional producer milk moves into and attaches itself to the market, the 
Class I base percentage will decrease. 
Gordon Laughlin, talking before the Great Lakes - Southern Milk annual 
meeting, stated that the Puget Sound Class I base percentage was 65.2 percent 
in 1971, dropped to 57.07 percent in 1972, and he was estimating that it 
would be 50 percent or less for 1973. The Class I base plan in the Puget 
Sound area has resulted in a real race for base. A producer with 1000 pounds 
daily production history in 1971 would have had a base of 652 pounds. By 
1973, if his production had remained at the 1000 pounds daily, his base would 
be only 500 pounds. Looking at it the other way, he would have had to 
increase his daily production to 1304 pounds to maintain the 652 pounds base 
he had in 1971, approximately 30 percent. 
Another problem we thought we would encounter would be the shifting 
of producers between the markets if Indiana was the only order in the Mid-
west to have a Class I base plan. This is one aspect that could have a 
serious impact on the Ohio markets. Producers living along the Indiana-Ohio 
line, the Indiana-Michigan, Indiana-Kentucky, or Indiana-Illinois line would 
probably have access to another Federal order market and he could sell his 
base and move to one of the other Federal order markets. For example, it 
would be possible to sell the base if Indiana had a Class I base plan and 
start shipping to the Ohio Valley market and get the blend price immediately. 
This probably would be comparable on an annual basis to the price he received 
under the base plan; but it could vary widely depending on the month, as the 
Class I utilization percentage between the two orders is relatively the 
same - Ohio, 1971 - 68 percent Class I and Indiana, 1971 - 70 percent Class I 
utilization. For any increase in his production, he would receive the blend 
price under the Ohio Valley Order and the same would be true for the Kentucky 
or Illinois orders. While under a Class I base plan, if he had additional 
production throughout the year, he would receive the excess on order Class 
III price for the additional production until a new base was determined the 
following February. If it had been possible that the producers would have 
voted a Class I base plan into the Indiana order, it would have meant that 
the order would have been an island surrounded by Federal orders paying a 
blend price. 
As we pointed out, a producer could sell his base and it would be like 
a pension or retirement plan to someone who had access to another market. 
He could sell his base and start shipping to a surrounding Federal order 
market that did not have a Class I base plan. This, I believe, would be one 
of the real dangers to the continued orderly marketing of producer milk 
because of the overlapping of routes moving to the Federal order markets 
surrounding the Indiana market. 
The seasonal pricing plan (sometimes referred to as the Louisville 
Plan) in most of the Federal order markets, including the Ohio order, would 
be eliminated in an Order with a Class I base plan. This would result in a 
misalignment of prices during the four take-out months and the four pay-back 
months. This would result in producer dissatisfaction and certainly would 
not be conducive to orderly marketing of milk if milk was produced for a mar-
ket with a Class I base plan by a producer and his neighbor was producing 
for a market operating with the Louisville Plan and blend price. 
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In summary, the decision of Hoosier Milk Marketing Agency, Inc., to 
table the Class I base plan proposals for the Indiana Order indefinitely was 
the decision that had to be made, as it became evident that the plan would 
not manage production or protect the market from outside milk and it could 
penalize some producers while benefiting others. Any program designed to 
manage production and protect producer income certainly must represent more 
than one percent of the total United States production. Production of produ-
cer milk in the Indiana Order was 1.8 billion pounds, while the national 
production was approximately 119 billion. 
Certainly, the producers producing the milk and the coops marketing 
the milk in the Western part of Ohio are going to have a more orderly market 
because the Indiana marketing area does not have a Class I base plan. 
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REGULATORY MILK PRICING -- PROBLEMS AND ISSUES 
Ronald Knutson 
Staff Economist 
U. S. Department of Agriculture 
It is easier to talk about milk pricing problems and issues than ~t 
is to talk about their solution. I rationalize talking mostly about prob-
lems by keeping in mind that defining a problem is a first step to solving 
a problem. 
The Milk Pricing Problem 
No one needs to be told that the dairy industry has a pricing problem. 
The problem is not easy to define. It has many dimensions: 
1. It is a problem of cycles of production and prices. These cycles 
draw productive resources into an industry when prices are high and 
force them out when prices are low. They are revealed in the peak 
production, surplus conditions, and low prices experienced in the 
early 1960's and the sharp declines in production, relative deficit 
conditions, and relatively higher prices, experienced in the middle 
to late 1960's. These production price cycles result, at least in 
part, from improper or lagged price adjustment and/or overreaction 
to changes in economic conditions in the milk industry. Resource 
misallocation results as production and processing resources move 
into the industry during periods of expansion and are forced out 
during periods of contraction. 
The development of a pricing system which provides early sensiti-
vity to factors such as present and future costs of producing milk, 
alternative farm and off-farm opportunities, and the effects of prices, 
substitutes, income, and population growth on demand may provide 
opportunities to anticipate changes in the industry supply-demand 
balance. 
Even if such early sensitivity exists, some question whether pro-
ducers change production patterns in response to relatively small 
changes which result from manipulation of support and Federal order 
prices. They argue that the price shock is generally not great 
enough to change producer plans and that at blend or support price 
levels it is still profitable to increase production. 
Proponents of this position argue for National base plans which pro-
vide the flexibility to price marginal surplus production at a level 
which is in the economist's jargon below the marginal cost of produc-
tion. The effect on production, they argue, would be more direct 
and instantaneous -- higher culling, closer evaluation of concentrate 
feeding rates, and closer assessment of expansion plans. These argu-
ments of the proponents of base plans are at least partially valid. 
The controversy is over other effects -- the impact on efficiency, 
regional patterns of production, capitalization barriers to entry, 
and ineffectiveness of existing base plans, political and administra-
2. 
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tive feasibility of the base plan proposals, and conflicts in values over 
the extent to which the dairy industry should be controlled by Government • 
The competitive manufacturing milk pricing base for the milk industry 
-- the Minnesota-Wisconsin price series -- will need to be replaced as 
conversion to Grade A milk occurs. The Minnesota-Wisconsin price ser-
ies has been a prime mover of Federal order prices. Conversion to Grade 
A will eventually mean that compatitive pay prices for manufacturing 
milk will no longer exist. The conclusion, of course, is that most con-
verted Grade A production will become associated with a Federal order 
because of its normally higher blend or producer pay price. 
There are also implications for the support program. Its prime 
focus has been to support the price level for manufacturing grade 
milk. Assuming the support program is retained when conversion takes 
place, this focus necessarily changes to one of achieving the parity 
price objective for all milk. Yet the price for all milk is affected 
by both Federal order and support prices. Class I prices could take 
on new significance in terms of achieving the parity price objective, 
In any case, movement toward a single grade of milk will likely re-
quire that there be closer coordination between the support and Federal 
order programs in terms of the most appropriate way to attain the sup-
port objective at prices which are adequate but do not produce 
excessive milk supplies. 
3. The milk pricing problem is also a problem of competition. It is a 
problem of competition both among cooperatives and between coopera-
tives and the non-member. In part, it is a problem of variation in 
services performed for handlers and improper pricing of those services 
relative to the costs of performing them. Improper pricing results 
both from a lack of knowledge of the cost of providing specific ser-
VICes, and from an inability to recover costs because of competition. 
The competitive pricing problem also results from the fact that the 
benefits of cooperatives cannot be limited to cooperative members. 
Or, put another way, the costs of cooperatives are not shared in 
relation to the benefits. I will have more to say about the dimen-
sions of the solution to this problem later. 
The competitive problem is more complex today because of competition 
among uses for milk. A highly desirable 12 percent increase in de-
mand for cheese this year has resulted in cheese plants being able 
to bid milk away from butter-powder plants. The result has been keen 
competition among uses for milk and low margins for butter-powder 
operations. While most people view this as a temporary phenomena, it 
has created a short-term pricing problem. 
4. The current pricing problem is also a legal problem. The legal 
problem may be viewed as having two dimensions. From a legislative 
standpoint statutory limits exist on what the Secretary can feasibly 
do to deal with issues in milk pricing. The Agricultural Act of 
1949 requires that the support price for manufacturing milk be estab-
lished between 75 and 90 percent of parity -- no higher and no lower. 
Class I base plan legislation provides that the over-base price be 
no lower than the surplus Class price. Non-price Federal orders are 
not presently provided for in legislation. These are but a few 
examples of legal limits on the Secretary's authority to deal with 
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pricing problems. To remove them, the legislation itself must be 
modified. 
The second dimension of the legal problem is an anti-trust prob-
lem. The current anti-trust suits raise several questions with 
respect to the practices cooperatives can utilize to deal with 
pricing problems -- particularly as they concern other coopera-
tives, the non-member, and the independent hauler. Until these 
questions are resolved, cooperatives' ability to deal with cer-
tain pricing problems will be uncertain. 
With this by way of background on the forces which are requiring a 
change in milk pricing procedures and some limits on them, let me now dis-
cuss with you some specific aspects of these problems as they relate to 
their pricing implications. I would like to deal with three specific 
areas: Class I pricing, surplus pricing, and service charges or payments. 
Class I Pricing 
One alternative in this area is an economic formula. It requires the 
development of factors which will effect changes in milk supply and demand. 
As you know, there are a host of variables that affect milk supply and 
demand. Economists have met with only limited success in developing equa-
tions which accurately forecast either milk supply or milk demand. We have 
tried to develop this type of formula and you will be interested in the 
types of problems we are running into. They include: what variables to 
include, how to express these variables, how much weight to give each 
variable, what base period to use, how to deal with lags involved, and how 
sensitive to make the formula, to mention a few. 
One of the early problems you run into in developing an economic for-
mula is that economically and statistically sound estimating equations 
invariably yield milk prices which are highly sensitive to changes in milk 
supply or demand. Thus, when milk supplies increase, say one percent, 
prices fall drastically -- four or five percent. Now this should not be 
surprising to anyone -- we have known for some time that both the demand 
and supply of milk are highly inelastic. This is precisely one of the 
major reasons we have the Federal order and support price program -- to 
lend price and income stability to the industry. The question is impor-
tantly one of how these price swings can be moderated but yet maintain a 
relative balance between supply and demand -- given the fact and assuming 
we are willing to continue to purchase some residuals under the support 
program. 
One advantage of an economic formula method of pricing is that it 
hopefully could provide anticipatory insight into forces at work affect-
ing supply and demand. Hopefully, it would make possible price adjustments 
prior to the development of sizable shortages or surpluses and thereby 
eliminate the need for larger adjustments later. Even though it may not 
be possible to develop a supply-demand equilibrium formula as the sole 
method of establishing Class I prices; such a formula could be used as an 
important adjunct in establishing prices through some type of hearing 
process where all pertinent information was presented as the basis for the 
Secretary's reaching a decision as to changes needed in Class I prices. 
I'll A~v ~ 1irr1~ mnrA Ahnttt this anoroach later. 
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Another alternative is some modification of the type of formula sup-
ported by the National Milk Producers Federation. This formula included 
12 factors divided into four groups. The four factor groups were chosen 
to reflect: (1) the ability and willingness of consumers to buy; (2) cost 
factors in producing milk; (3) alternative opportunities; and (4) manufac-
tured dairy product prices. The Department felt that this formula divorced the 
establishment of Class I prices from the rest of the dairy economy to too 
great an extent. Particularly, the lack of sufficient coordination with 
actions under the price support program was a concern. Furthermore, there 
was little indication that many of the individual formula factors had any 
logically consistent economic relationship to the price of milk. 
Another alternative would be some type of product price formula as a 
basic mover for Class I prices. Butter-powder formulas and cheese milk 
formulas have been used in the industry and in Federal milk orders for a 
long time. They involve the use of market prices, yields, and processing 
costs in estimating the value of milk for manufacturing. They are esti-
mates of what plants can afford to pay (as contrasted to the Minnesota-
Wisconsin price which reflects prices reported paid). 
Two main problems exist in developing product price formulas: (1) 
developing adequate measures of prices for manufactured products, and (2) 
determining appropriate make allowances. 
Workable product price formulas will require better indicators of 
product prices than presently exist. Central markets for butter and cheese 
are too thin to serve as a base for formula prices. If they are to be 
utilized, their competitive base will need to be broadened and closer super-
vision of the market will be required. An alternative to relying on 
exchange prices is to utilize actual prices received for products by a 
sample of processors. 
Because of the wide variations in plant efficiencies and problems of 
cost allocation, it is difficult to arrive at a "make allowance" that is 
representative. Our experience has been that evidence presented at hear-
ings usually is so conflicting as to provide an unsatisfactory basis for 
determining make allowances. That is not to say that this is an insur-
mountable problem, but suggests the need for developing more complete data 
on processing costs under varying conditions. 
Another alternative means of establishing Class I prices would be to 
regularly (say once a year) hold a national hearing to consider changes 
needed in Class I prices and possibly also the dairy price support level. 
Such a hearing would provide a forum at which all interested parties would 
have the opportunity to present evidence on the current and prospective 
supply-demand situation. 
Such a procedure would probably make it necessary for the Government 
to take an active role in the presentation of evidence bearing on changes 
needed in Class I and price support levels. The Government witnesses 
could be cross-examined and various industry representatives could present 
detailed information and analysis as to changes they think are needed in 
milk prices. Economic type formulas such as that developed by the National 
Milk Producers Federation study group or supply-demand equilibrium models 
such as I discussed earlier could be presented in evidence and might pro-
vide helpful guidance as to needed changes. 
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Use of the hearing approach would, in effect, recognize that the forces 
affecting milk supply and demand are so complex and diverse as to make it 
impossible to rely upon any one mechanistic measure to adjust prices. If 
this approach were to be adopted, it might be desirable to prescribe 
specific factors which must be considered in arriving at any decision as to 
price changes. Also, provision might be made to provide some basic anchor 
which prices might not depart from by more than a specified amount. If the 
price support decision was to be considered at the same time as the Class I 
price decision, the means for coordination of the two programs would be pro-
vided. This coordination might well serve as the anchor needed in any 
scheme of modifying Class I prices. 
One of the drawbacks of the hearing procedure for establishing Class I 
prices might be that the period following the annual hearing might become a 
rallying point for various producer and other groups to descend on Washing-
ton with view to applying all the political pressure that could be mustered 
to influence the decision. 
Surplus Pricing 
Surplus pr~c1ng is probably the most difficult and most controversial 
area the Department faces in milk pricing. Serious problems arise if the 
surplus price is established at levels which are too high or too low. 
Volumes of surplus milk handled vary substantially between markets and 
between individual handlers. In addition, there are wide differences among 
and within markets in the variability of the amount of surplus milk processed 
from day to day and seasonally. This influences surplus processing costs. 
Separate and apart from the size and variability of the surplus, there are 
differences in plant efficiencies among and within markets. Also, there 
are differences among and within markets in the products in which surplus 
milk is utilized. These products, at times, have considerably different 
use values. All of these factors make it difficult to arrive at a single 
price which will be acceptable to all parties. 
The Department has chosen wherever possible to rely upon competitive 
pay prices for two reasons: (1) the difficulty in obtaining adequate 
information at public hearings as to make allowances; and (2) the use of 
competitive pay prices assures that surplus prices in milk orders are in 
line with prices paid for manufacturing grade milk by unregulated manufac-
turing plants. 
As competitive pay prices disappear, it is apparent that other methods 
of establishing surplus prices will have to be used. Product price for-
mulas are the most apparent alternative. But as I said before, better 
information on product prices and costs are needed if product price formulas 
are to be satisfactory. Some method of automatically updating cost allow-
ances in such formulas is being explored. 
Surplus pricing does not end with the method for establishing the 
prices. There are some very knotty issues that are at the heart of the 





Whether the same surplus prices should be used in all 
markets and, if not, the basis for establishing differ-
ent levels in different areas; 
The level of efficiency to which surplus prices should 
be keyed if the same surplus price is used in all areas; 
The number of surplus classes to establish and which 
products to include in which class. 
Cooperatives in many areas tell us they are losing money on the handling 
of surplus milk; particularly, we hear this from operators of butter-powder 
plants. In other areas, we hear of cooperatives being able to sell milk 
for surplus use at premiums of 30-35 cents over the Minnesota-Wisconsin 
price. 
To a certain extent the existence of such premiums and butter-powder 
plant losses results from competition exerted on the raw milk price by an 
unusually strong cheese market. When cheese manufacturing capacity adjusts 
to this expanding market, relief from this situation can be anticipated. 
There is, however, no question that there are variations in the cost 
of handling surplus milk among markets. Such differences are, in my 
opinion, importantly due to differences in costs of performing the bal-
ancing functions in markets of different size, in different locations, and 
with different fluid utilization. The real question is whether surplus 
prices should be adjusted to reflect such differences! Experience in 
Federal orders indicates that important economic distortions can result 
from tampering with Class II prices on a market-by-market basis. 
My inclination, as a matter of economic philosophy, is to attack the 
problem in the most direct way possible. If the problem is one of differ-
ences in costs associated with balancing, then a recognition of such costs 
should be included in a service charge pricing strategy for the market. 
Variations in costs of handling surplus milk should then be covered through 
service charges on Class I milk. 
The only question is whether this should be done in the public sector 
within Federal orders or in the private sector by cooperatives. 
Service Charges 
Our discussion of surplus pricing has led us to the question of whether 
service charges should be integrated into the Federal order pricing system. 
This is a complex question and I will speak of it only philosophically. I 
like to distinguish between three kinds of services performed for a market: 
(1) those services performed as a necessary aspect of administering a 
Federal order market -- testimony or other activities related to the regula-
tory environment, research on milk marketing problems, educational activi-
ties, and maybe promotion, (2) those services associated with performing 
the balancing function, and (3) those specific services rendered handlers 
in the procurement of quality milk supplies at specific times. 
There are two main problems encountered with service charges: (1) 
identifying what services are being performed by whom. and who is receiving 
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the benefits, and (2) putting a price tag on the value of services per-
formed. With respect to the farmer, it must be remembered that coopera-
tives are not the only ones who provide services to a market, and some 
services provided by the cooperative are provided mainly to the benefit 
of cooperative members. 
The problem of putting a price tag on services is even more complex. 
Hearings have not been a very good vehicle for establishing the appropriate 
level of make allowances. Can one expect more in the case of service 
charges? 
In my view, there is a more important philosophical question of the 
extent to which we want to turn the milk industry into a public utility as 
opposed to a more open, competitive system. We have, wisely in my opinion, 
had a policy minimizing the degree of price regulation. The system has 
had its problems, but it has worked reasonably well -- particularly when 
compared with price and rate regulatory counterparts such as resale price 
regulation for dairy products, regulation of transportation, power, and 
communication. We have maintained a high degree of industry productivity, 
efficiency, reasonable price and income stability with a minimum of sacri-
fice of freedom. How far do you go in rate regulation before you hamstring 
an industry? I do not profess to know the answer to this question. There 
is probably good justification for certain service charges, but there is 
also the very legitimate question of how far you go and how you get there. 
